Infrequently Noted

Apple's standards engineers have a long and inglorious history of stalling tactics in standards bodies to delay progress on important APIs, like Declarative Shadow DOM (DSD).

The idea behind DSD was not new, and the intensity of developer demand had only increased since Dimitri's 2015 sketch. A 2017 attempt to revive it was shot down in 2018 by Apple engineers without evidence or data.

Throughout this period, Apple would engage sparsely in conversations, sometimes only weighing in at biannual face-to-face meetings. It was gobsmacking to watch them argue that features were unnecessary directly to the developers in the room who were personally telling them otherwise. This was disheartening because a key goal of any proposal was to gain support from iOS. In a world where nobody else could ship-and-let-live, and where Mozilla could not muster an opinion (it did not ship Web Components until late 2018), any whiff of disinterest from Apple was sufficient to kill progress.

The phrase "stop-energy" is often misused, but the dampening effect of Apple on the progress of Web Components after 2015-2016's burst of V1 design energy was palpable. After that, the only Web Components features that launched in leading-edge browsers were those that an engineer and PM were willing to accept could only reach part of the developer base.

I cannot stress enough how effectively this slowed progress on Web Components. The pantomime of regular face-to-face meetings continued, but Apple just stopped shipping. What had been a grudging willingness to engage on new features became a stalemate.

But needs must.

In early 2020, after months of background conversations and research, Mason Freed posted a new set of design alternatives, which included extensive performance research. The conclusion was overwhelming: not only was Declarative Shadow DOM now in heavy demand by the community, but it would also make websites much faster.

The proposal looked shockingly like those sketched in years past. In a world where <template> existed and Shadow DOM V1 had shipped, the design space for Declarative Shadow DOM alternatives was not large; we just needed to pick one.

An updated proposal was presented to the Web Components Community Group in March 2020; Apple objected on spurious grounds, offering no constructive counter.^[2]

Residual questions revolved around security implications of changing parser behaviour, but these were also straightforward. The first draft of Mason's Explainer even calls out why the proposal is less invasive than a whole new element.

Recall that Web Components and the <template> element themselves were large parser behaviour changes; the semantics for <template> even required changes to the long-settled grammar of XML (long story, don't ask). A drumbeat of (and proposals for) new elements and attributes post-HTML5 also represent identical security risks, and yet we barrel forward with them. These have notably included <picture>, <portal> (proposed), <fencedframe> (proposed), <dialog>, <selectmenu> (proposed), and <img srcset>.

The addition of <template shadowroot="open"> would, indeed, change parser behaviour, but not in ways that were unknowably large or unprecedented. Chromium's usage data, along with the HTTP Archive crawl HAR file corpus, provided ample evidence about the prevalence of patterns that might cause issues. None were detected.

And yet, at TPAC 2020, Apple's representatives continued to press the line that large security issues remained. This was all considered at length. Google's security teams audited the colossal volume of user-generated content Google hosts for problems and did not find significant concerns. And yet, Apple continued to apply stop-energy.

The feature eventually shipped with heavy developer backing as part of Chromium 90 in April 2021 but without consensus. Apple persistently repeated objections that had already been answered with patient explication and evidence.

Cupertino is now implementing this same design, and Safari will support DSD soon.

This has not been the worst case of Apple deflection and delay — looking at you, Push Notifications — but serves as an exemplar of the high-stakes games that Apple (and, to a lesser extent, Mozilla) have forced problem solvers to play over their dozen years of engine disinvestment.

Even in Chromium, DSD was delayed by several quarters. Because of the Apple Browser Ban, cross-OS availability was further postponed by two years. The fact that Apple will ship DSD without changes and without counterproposals across the long arc of obstruction implies claims of caution were, at best, overstated.

The only folks to bring data to the party were Googlers and web developers. No new thing was learned through groundless objection. No new understanding was derived from the delay. Apple did no research about the supposed risks. It has yet to argue why it's safe now, but wasn't then.

So let's call it what it was: concern trolling.

Uncritical acceptance of the high-quality design it had long delayed is an admission, of sorts. It shows a ennui about meeting developer and user needs (until pressed), paired with great skill at deflection.

The playbook is simple:

• Use opaque standards processes to make it look like occasional attendance at a F2F meeting is the same thing as good-faith co-engineering.
• "Just ask questions" when overstretched or uninterested in the problem.
• Spread FUD about the security or privacy of a meticulously-vetted design.
• When all else fails, say you will formally object and then claim that others are "shipping whatever they want" and "not following standards" when they carefully launch a specced and tested design you were long consulted about, but withheld good faith engagement to improve.

The last step works because only insiders can distinguish between legitimate critiques and standards process jockeying. Hanging the first-mover risk around the neck of those working to solve problems is nearly cost-free when you can also prevent designs from moving forward in standards, paired with a market veto (thaks to anti-competitive shenanigans).

Play this dynamic out over dozens of features across a decade, and you'll better understand why Chromium participants get exercised about responsibility theatre by various Apple engineers. Understood in context, it decodes as delay and deflection from using standards bodies to help actually solve problems.

Cupertino has paid no price for deploying these smoke screens, thanks to the Apple Browser Ban and a lack of curiosity in the press. Without those shields, Apple engineers would have had to offer convincing arguments from data for why their positions were correct. Instead, they have whatabouted for over three years, only to suddenly implement proposals they recently opposed when the piercing gaze of regulators finally fell on WebKit.^[3] ↩︎

The presence or absence of a counterproposal when objecting to a design is a primary indicator of seriousness within a standards discussion. All parties will have been able to examine proposals before any meeting, and in groups that operate by consensus, blocking objections are understood to be used sparingly by serious parties.

It's normal for disagreements to surface over proposed designs, but engaged and collaborative counter-parties will offer soft concerns – "we won't block on this, but we think it could be improved..." – or through the offer to bring a counterproposal. The benefits of a concrete counter are large. It demonstrates good faith in working to solve the problem and signals a willingness to ship the offered design. Threats to veto, or never implement a specific proposal, are just not done in the genteel world of web standards.

Over the past decade, making veto threats while offering neither data nor a counterproposal have become a hallmark of Apple's web standards footprint. It's a bad look, but it continues because nobody in those rooms wants to risk pissing off Cupertino. Your narrator considered a direct accounting of just the consequences of these tactics a potentially career-ending move; that's how serious the stakes are.

The true power of a monopoly in standards is silence — the ability to get away with things others blanch at because they fear you'll hold an even larger group of hostages next time. ↩︎

Apple has rolled out the same playbook in dozens of areas over the last decade, and we can learn a few things from this experience.

First, Apple corporate does not care about the web, no matter how much the individuals that work on WebKit (deeply) care. Cupertino's artificial bandwidth constraints on WebKit engineering ensured that it implements only when pressured.

That means that external pressure must be maintained. Cupertino must fear losing their market share for doing a lousy job. That's a feeling that hasn't been felt near the intersection of I-280 and CA Route 85 in a few years. For the web to deliver for users, gatekeepers must sleep poorly.

Lastly, Apple had the capacity and resources to deliver a richer web for a decade but simply declined. This was a choice — a question of will, not of design correctness or security or privacy.

Safari 16.4 is evidence, an admission that better was possible, and the delaying tactics were a sort of gaslighting. Apple disrespects the legitimate needs of web developers when allowed, so it must not be.

Lack of competition was the primary reason Apple feared no consequence for failing to deliver. Apple's protectionism towards Safari's participation-prize under-achievement hasn't withstood even the faintest whiff of future challengers, which should be an enduring lesson: no vendor must ever be allowed to deny true and effective browser competition. ↩︎